



The rise in subprime mortgages in the early 2000s may have
driven up rents, and put the rental market at greater risk of
lease default.
Much research and commentary has been written on the impacts of subprime and other ‘exotic’
mortgage products in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crash. In recent research, Brent
Ambrose looks back to the early part of the last decade and finds that the rise of subprime
mortgages had a spillover effect on the housing rental market. He finds that higher-income renters
left the market to take advantage of easier credit for mortgages. As a result, a higher proportion of
households remaining in the rental market had lower incomes and a higher incidence of default
on their lease contracts, which in turn led to rising rents. He argues that while the promotion of
subprime mortgages was ostensibly so that people could own a home, the policy may have had a
disproportionately negative impact on the part of the population least able to bear the increased rents. 
During the housing boom of the previous decade, the development of exotic mortgage products and the
widespread use of risk-based pricing, along with the easing of underwriting standards, allowed households
previously excluded from the mortgage market to have access to mortgage financing, thereby achieving their
lifelong objective of owning a home.  This migration to homeownership is a direct result of various housing policies
designed to provide access to and support the mortgage markets. Such policies include the mortgage interest
deduction for homeowners, the creation of the government sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac),
and the Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance program.  Although many studies have examined the
positive aspects associated with homeownership, policies designed to encourage mortgage originations can have
negative consequences on the rental market. In new research, I find that a one percent increase in subprime
mortgage origination activity in the early 2000s corresponded with a near 2 percent increase in the rental market
lease default rate.
In thinking about the interaction of policies that promote homeownership and mortgage expansion, consider
where these new homeowners were before purchasing their new home.  They were renters.  Owning and renting
are substitutes, with household characteristics and financial considerations playing an important role in
determining housing demand and tenure choice decisions.  Since most households typically borrow the bulk of the
purchase price of their home, the availability of mortgage financing influences these decisions as well. Thus, the
sustained growth in mortgage lending from 2001 to 2006, attributed in part to the interaction of looser underwriting
standards and the development of innovative mortgage products targeted at under-served populations, enabled
numerous households previously excluded from the mortgage market to achieve, at least temporarily, the
American dream of homeownership.
However, while the homeownership rate was increasing, the risk profile for the population of renters also
changed.  For example, Figure 1 shows the deterioration in median household income earned by renters as
compared to the national median household income. Consistent with the notion that the characteristics of the
renter population shifted during the housing bubble, the median renter household income as a percentage of all
household median income declined from 67.5 percent in 2001 to 62.7 percent by 2005, indicating a significant
shift in the income level of the renter population. This increase in the risk profile of the rental population is
consistent with the notion that expansion in mortgage credit through subprime lending altered the underlying risk
distribution of the rental population.
Figure 1: Homeownership Rates, Median Renter Income/All Household Income Ratio, and Housing
Opportunity Index
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and the National Association of Home Builders
Figure 2 illustrates the significant positive relation between the growth in subprime mortgage lending and risk in
the rental market.  Using data from a credit bureau that reports rental payment history, Figure 2 displays the
rental/lease default proportional hazard curves for a random sample of multifamily leases between 2001 and 2006
in markets that experienced low and high subprime activity.  In this figure, low subprime markets are Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the bottom quartile of the distribution of subprime lending activity and high subprime
areas are in the top quartile.  The hazard curves show a steep increase in defaults during the first months,
reaching a maximum at around month five, and a slower downward trend as leases are removed from the sample
after the first default event is observed. In addition, the evolution of hazard curves in the high subprime MSAs
(Figure 3) shows a pattern of increasing lease defaults coinciding with the growth in subprime lending.
Figure 2: Proportional Hazard Curves for MSAs with Low and High Subprime Origination Activity from
2002 to 2006
Figure 3: Evolution of Lease Hazard Curves in MSAs with High Subprime Mortgage Origination Activity
In our research, we demonstrate how growth in subprime originations produced a ripple effect on the rental
market.  The results consistently show that a one percent increase in subprime mortgage origination activity
during the period from 2002 to 2006 corresponded to an approximately 1.9 percent increase in the rental market
lease default rate. This increase in rental default risk resulted from the migration of lower risk renters into
homeownership.  This shift in the underlying risk profile of the renter population was observed and priced.  Areas
that experienced higher rental default rates subsequently experienced higher rents.  Furthermore, the increase in
lease defaults affected the riskiness of cash flows generated from rental multifamily properties.
The observed increase in rental risk that resulted as subprime mortgage originations increased provides an
important cautionary note when evaluating the benefits associated with public policies.  Policies designed to
promote a particular social outcome in an effort to capitalize on its perceived external benefits could result in
unintended consequences for another segment of society.  For example, the expansion of mortgage credit that
provided the benefits of homeownership to a large segment of the population during the housing boom in the
previous decade may have resulted in higher rental rates for the segment of the population that remained in the
rental market.  Thus, to the extent that a larger portion of the lowest income segment of the population remains in
the rental market, the expansion in mortgage credit may have had a disproportionately negative impact on this
segment of the population least able to bear the consequences of the increased rental rates that resulted from the
shift in the rental population risk profile.
This article is based on the paper “Spillover Effects of Subprime Mortgage Originations: The Effects of Single-
family Mortgage Credit Expansion on the Multifamily Rental Market” in the Journal of Urban Economics.
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